by Dave Hansen, Morgan Musser, and Bruce Villasenor
Abstract
This paper examines the question of whether NATO is currently enabled to effectively compete in gray-zone conflict by reviewing NATO's strategy through changes made to force structure and other areas over the past decade. While NATO has taken steps toward developing a defensive posture, the overwhelming preponderance of its efforts remains focused on conventional deterrence models. The paradox confronting NATO is that its force enhancement initiatives deter a security challenge that is unlikely to materialize. This, despite the knowledge Russia chooses forums of military competition which involve low risk of escalation, where it can pick its targets on a global and regional basis, limit intervention, and achieve gains at minimum cost and exposure. To this end, NATO has not addressed many of the key challenges posed by the methods Russia executes for long-term strategic competition. The paper concludes that NATO has not fully operationalized a strategy that can effectively respond to the fact that most military competition with Russia, for at least the next decade, will take form in the gray area. Regardless how much the US or NATO build up their global military forces and readiness, the resulting increase in conventional strength will only serve a strategic purpose if they are able to deter theater conflict. Stated plainly, NATO continues to prepare for the wrong kind of war. Recommendations are offered to minimize Russia’s attempts to influence other nations, maximize opportunities from conflicts, and gain strategic leverage.
“For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting, this is the acme of skill…There is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare." ― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Introduction
After nearly thirty years, the term ‘gray-zone” conflict re-appeared in US defense documents in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, referencing challenges that occur in an “ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully peace.” Gray-zone activities are not new, and military historians may point out that all wars included hybrid elements.[1] Most of what today comprises as gray-zone conflict fits squarely with what George Kennan described as “the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace…short of war, to achieve… objectives.”[2] Even the most cursory review of twentieth-century Cold War history points to a number of the hallmarks of gray-zone warfare (often referred to as hybrid or threshold warfare) including subversion, disinformation, and economic coercion. All were central elements of then-Soviet intelligence operations, known as “active measures.” Such actions continue today. Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 demonstrated employment of combined supply disruptions, cyber-attacks, economic and political influence, and disinformation efforts to undermine the country’s energy security and sow political instability. “Gray-zone” activities are often ambiguous, and many do not explicitly violate the current post-Cold War international system, rendering traditional deterrence models of overwhelming force impractical.
“Gray-zone warfare” is defined as an aggressor engaging in political actions that circumvent traditional norms and laws of war, in the pursuit of objectives that are difficult to achieve with conventional force options. The government on the receiving end usually struggles to confront and limit the aggressors’ actions. The ‘gray’ antagonist wages a subtle war in which they are better able to control informational narratives and conduct warfare in a way that it prevents the opposing state from unleashing all of its hard and soft power to defeat it. Properly addressing an adversary in such a context necessitates the use of measured doses of instrumental power.[3]
Adversaries like Russia now possess a broad range of tools capable of being deployed with far greater reach and impact than those of previous decades. Russia today is a revisionist power, seeking to re-establish its influence in the post-Soviet space and change the post-Cold War security order in Europe. This emerged as the central challenge to European prosperity and security: the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition. It is increasingly clear Russia seeks to shape a world consistent with its authoritarian model – gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. In 2014, Putin officially approved this model of competition[4] in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.[5]The doctrine describes Russia’s view of modern warfare as the “integrated employment of military force and political, economic, informational or other non-military measures implemented with a wide use of the protest potential and select employment of special operations forces.”[6] Russia transitioned to and has effectively employed its “New Generation Warfare” in Georgia, the Donbass, Crimea, and the Baltic States.
Russia now appears ready to sustain such actions for looming competition well into the 2020s.[7] The 2007 cyberattack in Tallinn, Estonia[8] and the 2017 MAERSK cyber-attack targeted by the ‘notPetyo’ malware virus[9] demonstrated the increasing need to operationalize an international capacity to react.[10] In 2020, a suspected Russian group, Berserk Bear APT, launched cyber-attacks against German energy companies after being implicated in previous attacks against German utilities in 2018.[11] Russian-backed cyber-attacks against energy assets were identified by a number of Alliance members, including Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Its cyber campaigns have run concurrent with other hybrid threats against energy assets, like malign influence efforts, natural gas supply cutbacks, and attacks on oil rigs in the Black Sea.[12] Thus, despite the ability to recognize and describe the problem,[13] NATO has fallen short in several areas of deterrence which include operationalizing and integrating capacity within actionable tools that are fit-for-purpose.
The Wales Summit Declaration, issued in September 2014, vowed to ensure NATO could effectively address the challenges posed by these new techniques. The Declaration considered it essential that the Alliance possess “the necessary tools and procedures required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid warfare threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national forces.”[14] The threat posed by Russia’s employment of gray-zone activities would henceforth require an adaptation of NATO´s military strategic posture and its entire approach to territorial defense. It is against this backdrop that this paper examines the question of whether NATO formations are currently enabled to effectively compete in gray-zone conflict. Since 2014, has NATO established a strategy which enables a capacity to react and meet the requirements for a modern collective defense, while preserving balance with its core tasks? To examine these topics, this paper reviews NATO's strategy through the implementation of changes over the past decade, specifically NATO implementation of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP).[15]
It is important to also consider US posture towards hybrid warfare given the significant US contribution to NATO operations. Challenges within the force structure of both will be addressed, as well as a specific look into the information environment and cyber domain, key components of gray-zone warfare. Lastly, the paper offers recommendations to policymakers regarding how NATO might effectively operate in a gray-zone environment into the next decade.
NATO Strategy
Strategies for effectively tackling gray-zone warfare are not inherently concerned with balancing security threats, specifically when such events occur in the information or economic arena – areas which military commands are not well-organized to address. While senior NATO officials and planners have considered the significance of gray-zone conflict and the need to respond in a deliberate manner, several implementation challenges remain, especially in the pre-Article 5 declaration context.
At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO Allies stated that hybrid attacks could trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.[16] Collective attribution remained a delicate issue, as it touches upon national sovereignty. However, when Russian agents used a nerve agent in March 2018 in an attempt to kill a former double agent in Salisbury, UK, a joint statement was quickly released condemning the attack and expressing solidarity with the British Government. Most NATO and EU member states named Russia as the culprit, and NATO Allies and partners expelled over 140 Russian officials. While it is impossible to know for sure if such collective attribution (“name and shame”) deters future acts, Allies delivered the message that hybrid activities come at a price that not all attackers may be willing to pay.[17]
Despite this, examples of solidarity remain the exception, as challenges persist between NATO nations to integrate capabilities. First, there is no alliance-wide synergy of response tools enabling NATO nations. The 2015 Strategy on NATO’s Role in Countering Hybrid Warfare deferred on this, conceding the primacy of individual nations over collective action in countering hybrid acts.[18] Thus, several controlled technical resources are restricted to national use and remain unavailable to NATO formations.[19] Intelligence collection also remains varied between states. Intelligence sharing, a major tool in attributing hybrid threats, also remains limited. For example, there is not an Alliance-wide technical architecture for sharing near-real-time intelligence, especially between the NATO command structure and its subordinate formations. Protocols defining appropriate response options are limited and delineated command authority in multi-domain operations clarifying suitable, or legally appropriate responses to threshold activities are non-existent. This is especially challenging when Russia’s gray-zone behavior bypasses the norms of democracy and the rule of law abided by the US and NATO.
These challenges are not unique to the Alliance. The United States also lacks a strategy to employ a broad range of deterrence options.[20] The United States’ global “peace through strength” strategy leading up to 2014 did little to deter Russia from taking bold moves in Ukraine and Georgia. While the US has focused on “peace through strength” with its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), this is but a facet of global power competition. Given the deterioration of the Cold War-era arms control framework, it is certainly critical to sustain nuclear deterrence and conventional defense capabilities in the twenty-first century. However, while deterring “worst case” and nuclear wars is a key mission, it is not the central focus of long-term competition. Realistically, conventional deterrence models of overwhelming force offer little toward addressing gray-zone activities. Such broad strategies are not attuned to the flexibility required to respond on the sliding scale of gray-zone activities. Thus, hybrid threats will inevitably remain a long-term strategic challenge for the NATO Alliance.
The overarching issue with NATO policy against gray-zone coercion is that there remains no clear strategy with key objectives which align and sequence action. Given this ambiguity, the result is often a failure to commit to a unified response. This has been problematic for NATO in the last ten years. The following section will examine the changes that have occurred within NATO’s operational posture over the last decade to help address this.
Implementing Deterrence
Since 2014, NATO has undertaken efforts to improve its defense and deterrence posture, including the “Readiness Action Plan” following the Warsaw Summit of 2016; deployment of multinational forces in the Baltic States and Black Sea; a sizeable increase to the NATO Response Forces; an agreement to include hybrid threats in NATO exercises; an increased focus on resiliency; and the creation of the Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JSID).[21] The 2014 Wales Summit specifically established a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force that would increase the NATO Response Force to 40,000.[22] At the NATO Summit in 2018, a new initiative endorsed a “culture of readiness” and established a thirty-day timeline to use a set number of troops, vessels, and aircraft.[23] However, the level of commitment from contributing nations has lagged, undermining NATO’s credibility and questioning its ability to deter. The 2015 Strategy offered a framework for making progress. However, it was written initially in response to events in Ukraine in 2014 and was consequently abstract and aspirational.[24] NATO has since increased engagement with eastern partners like Ukraine and Georgia to complement the enhanced force posture. While such a force development strategy demonstrates NATO has at least considered options below the threshold of an Article 5 Declaration, serious questions regarding implementation and efficacy of force structure enhancements continue to plague the Alliance.
NATO has enhanced its forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, with four multinational battalion-size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland on a rotational basis. These battlegroups, led by the UK, Canada, Germany and the US respectively, are multinational, “combat-ready forces.” NATO touts the EFP as part of the biggest reinforcement of collective defense in a generation. However, the numbers are in fact quite small and the units continue to be plagued by interoperability challenges across each battlegroup.[25] It remains to be seen whether NATO Allies can overcome such challenges associated with multinational forces, especially in terms of equipment compatibility, English-language proficiency, and duplicative capabilities such as medical support and logistics.[26] It is also unclear who can order EFP units into action, as units fall under host-nation (not NATO) command. On the one hand, the EFP mission seeks to deter future territorial aggression by Russia. NATO indeed buttresses allied and partner security forces by building partner capacity and mandating hard defense options like the prepositioning of military equipment. On the other hand, the EFP battlegroups are only suited for deterring the most egregious scenario: a Russian military incursion. Given that an unambiguous invasion of allied territory remains unlikely, it is far more probable that crises will fall below the threshold of Article 5 and the Alliance’s mutual defense commitments. The Baltic States and Poland are at much greater risk from unattributable cyberattacks. This is especially true against critical infrastructure, ethnopolitical discord stemming from Russian-speaking communities or Russian minority groups, or disinformation campaigns designed to undermine NATO unity. EFP battlegroups simply are not trained, structured, or tasked to assist with any of these or similar gray-zone realities.
The Tailored Forward Presence (TFP) in the Black Sea was created after Wales in 2014, and now includes air, land and maritime components. The TFP is primarily a regional presence, in contrast to the EFP in the Baltics which employs an “all-Alliance approach.” While NATO maintains combat-ready, battalion-size battle groups around the Baltic Sea operating alongside national defense forces, NATO efforts in the Black Sea focus on training support and reassurance. Both efforts, however, rely upon traditional deterrence models. This includes deployment of NATO personnel to build local capacities to accept reinforcements and coordinate the increased tempo and scale of exercises. Effective deterrence therefore rests on projection of the ability and resolve to act if necessary. These deployments exist as an important part of a dynamic approach to the defense of vital U.S. and allied interests in the region. However, they simultaneously illuminate how NATO has failed to deter Russia’s aggressive behavior in several key areas. One specific example is at the Kerch Strait in the Sea of Azov. Considering Russia’s seizure of oil rigs in the Black Sea and aggressive action against Ukrainian ships—this area has been increasingly destabilized by Russia’s aggressive actions. [27] Thus, it has become increasingly clear that, except as a deterrent to Russia furthering its territorial expansion, none of the force posture changes implemented by NATO since 2014 are designed to counter specific gray-zone actions.
Currently, NATO tests readiness through large military exercises, inspections, and planning, [28] emphasizing preparations only for high-end conflict with Russia. This may be an unbalanced approach for preparing nations to deter gray-zone warfare. NATO’s 2015 Strategy on NATO’s Role in Countering Hybrid Warfare emphasized the need to convince potential adversaries that the consequences of pursuing their aims, in whatever domain, would outweigh the potential gains. While this could include measures taken by the wider international community (e.g., sanctions), NATO itself has continued to increase readiness and preparedness of its forces through large-scale conflict simulations, readiness deployments, and enforcements to command structure as part of its overall deterrence and defense posture. Although such efforts demonstrate the Alliance’s capacity to deploy appropriate forces when necessary and potentially fight Russia head-on, NATO’s approach to deterring Russia has largely remained unchanged for well over sixty years.
The challenge is equally problematic across the military’s functional domains. Presently, NATO retains no Information Operations-capable formations, and NATO has not signed on to offensive cyber, particularly in baseline (steady-state) operations. These capabilities are retained at the national level, in accordance with the 2015 Strategy and 2016 Warsaw Conference. Across the Alliance’s ten Multinational Joint Land Corps Headquarters, none retain authority or capacity to execute Information Operations outside of an Article 5 declaration. In Psychological Operations, NATO itself has no specific PSYOPs Support Element for the conduct of Military Information Support Operations (MISO). Leading up to an Article 5 declaration, should the NAC request one of its Corps HQ to deploy, it could take up to sixty days for member nations to form appropriate capabilities, potentially losing the advantage in the information environment. Each country that belongs to NATO has their own PSYOPs and IO capable forces. However, they are not allowed to combine under the NATO umbrella and cannot begin mission analysis until the political decision has been made with each country defining the political restraints of their involvement. This debilitates the speed of relevancy.
For cyber, NATO has committed to “Defensive Cyber.” The UK and US each support Offensive Cyber Operations with the limited ability to share only discreet special access programs. While some member states retain cyber planning capabilities within their Electronic Warfare formations, the NATO infrastructure is lacking, and there is no capability to execute offense. Therefore, any NATO unit seeking cyber operational support must ask for it from one of the nations who retain the capability. Since 2008, NATO has worked to increase its cyber defense posture. At the Brussels Summit in 2018, Allies agreed to set up a new Cyberspace Operations Centre as part of NATO’s strengthened Command Structure.[29] However, by declaring that the Alliance will not conduct offensive operations, NATO itself has not tackled offensive cyber capacity, except by declaring a willingness to integrate the effects of cyber conducted by member states in sovereign or multinational capacities. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Estonia offers education, consultation, lessons learned, and research and development.[30] Here, the Alliance’s integration of cyber effects could be conducted, but it remains focused primarily on training, research, and support to exercises.
Militarily, NATO does not retain authority to conduct baseline information operations or as noted above, offensive cyber. NATO simply lacks a clearly defined alliance-wide policy response.[31] In February 2019, Allies endorsed a NATO guide that set out a number of tools to further strengthen NATO’s ability to respond to significant malicious cyber activities.[32] However, it did not draw a clear line for when a cyber-attack is sufficiently harmful to cross the threshold as an armed attack. Additionally, NATO does not presently have an operational definition of what a collective response might be should the still-undefined threshold be crossed. While a certain degree of ambiguity is arguably beneficial by making opponents cautious of potential overreach, continued ambiguity on where the threshold lies might only encourage an opponent to continuously exploit the gray area.
Despite these challenges, the NATO toolbox does include a variety of instruments, such as the imposition of sanctions. And while the Alliance has made clear it neither limits punishment to similar cyber-attacks nor excludes them, it keeps the option open to use the full range of Allied capabilities to deter and counter gray-zone actions. At the 2018 Brussels Summit, Allies expressed their determination “to employ the full range of capabilities, including cyber, to deter, defend against, and to counter the full spectrum of cyber threats, including those conducted as part of a hybrid campaign.”[33] Thus, NATO could retaliate in a proportional manner, but it does not necessarily have to do so by granting the authority to mirror Russian activity, especially considering Russia employs tactics that violate the norms of the liberal international order. Corruption, illicit finance, elections interference, debt traps, the restriction of free speech, spreading false narratives, territorial aggression, and extra-legal operations are all areas NATO may rightfully choose to not engage.
From a technical standpoint, should an adversary proliferate computer viruses to shut down power grids, countering with a cyber-attack may not stop/prevent the attacker’s imminent capacity to reengage. Despite an open-ended potential for graduated response options, NATO policy on gray-zone activities, particularly in cyber and information remain wholly constructed around a defensive posture. Unfortunately, defensive actions do not adequately address either the safeguarding of personal data that Russian or other malign actors might use in cyber-enabled information warfare or the economic incentives that drive users toward such behavior.
Considering US cyber capacity, DoD’s stepped-up current posture of “persistent engagement” bodes well for active cyber defense.[34] However, questions remain as to whether it effectively enables operations to be deployed fast enough to address the ever-changing threat profiles and to manage escalation potential. Moreover, the approach requires the tight coupling of strategic ends—typically identified in an interagency policy process—and operational effects. It remains unclear if the current NATO collective defense strategy is able to deliver that coupling for US capabilities, which can create risks of unintended escalation or self-defeating effects not understood by well-meaning policymakers. Finally, significant gaps remain in intelligence and warning for cyber incidents across NATO, as well as normative frameworks to guide responsible use.[35]
Some efforts to resolve gray-zone conflict remain in their infancy. For example, in 2016, Finland instituted the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki with participation open to EU member states and NATO.[36] However, the Hybrid CoE provides only an analytical framework for the assessment of current and future hybrid warfare situations and their practical implication. The development of the Hybrid CoE is a model that could be applied in other regions for building capacity, and interoperability, and its existence is an important step forward for EU and NATO members to informally address vulnerabilities. However, this effort holds no authority or capacity to engage a response.
Holistically, despite a number of declarations, increased force presence in Eastern Europe, and newly formed information-sharing centers, NATO’s actions remain pursuant to conventional forms of military deterrence or research. None specifically counter gray-zone activity or prevent Russia from targeting weaker nations. From a military deterrence standpoint, there clearly appears to be a functional mismatch between NATO’s traditional hard deterrence and the hybrid actions it wishes to remedy. Integrating multiple elements of national security remains unaddressed.
Authorities
One of the key challenges often plaguing US and NATO response to gray-zone conflict is “authorities.” This problem is two-fold. The first are the challenges internal to the US regarding perceived inadequate or dispersed authorities to effectuate coherent activity. The second are insufficient authorities inside the NATO Alliance – partly a function of the political bureaucracy within NATO itself, arguably slow to elicit timely and relevant responses. Much of the literature on countering gray-zone activity recognizes the need for an interdependent system.[37] Critics have additionally pointed to several issues which include the lack of a holistic methodology for dealing with Russia’s gray-zone behavior.[38] But without a formalized methodology for defining and assigning policy priorities and actions, effective long-term strategies for deterring, competing against, and responding to competitors’ use of state-controlled forces will likely be limited.
Limitations precluding a real-time, multi-agency approach to address adversarial actions are especially salient in the information and cyber domains. Within the US government, responsibilities and authorities are spread across numerous entities, to include DoD, DoS, and Treasury. There is no unity of effort and no specific organization has lead for synchronizing the employment of all instruments of national power.[39] Within DoD, most of the capabilities reside inside the force structure of geographic and functional combatant commands (CCMD) and are tasked through unified combatant command (COCOM) authority. Authorities quickly cut across both functional and geographic lines. This may slow defining roles and responsibilities. Also, several offensive capabilities are either compartmentalized due to the technology behind them or, considering their effect, may yield undesirable strategic impact. Therefore, authorities for their use – specifically in the information and cyber domains are often retained at the SECDEFs level (or above). This can dramatically impact the speed of response. To fix this, some authorities (and associated risk acceptance) might be delegated down to Ambassador level, such that in a steady-state environment, permission might be granted to create effects in the information environment, while retaining country-team level and multi-agency awareness.
Additional challenges with authority are a result of ambiguity in US law. Both Title 10 and Title 22 authorities grant DoD and DoS authorities to support, train, and partner with forces, with legal checks and controls on human rights and accountability measures. However, there is no clear delineation over whether building/countering US local partners should be under Title 10 or Title 50 (Central Intelligence Agency) authorities. As a result, the question of who owns long-term proxy strategy and operational development remains unanswered in the US interagency.[40] This “authorities dilemma” is even more convoluted within the NATO alliance. The United States’ aspirational model for countering Russia’s gray-zone activity via whole-of-government approach, is not well-suited for a multinational security-based alliance.
Opportunities and Recommendations
There are several observably difficult challenges in how the US and NATO approach gray-zone competition, as a military, as individual nations, and as Allies. Such challenges do come with opportunities. The Department of Defense cannot abruptly restructure itself to engage in all gray-zone activities, nor should it necessarily want to. What the Alliance does have however, includes asymmetric advantages of transparency through its rule of law. The system of alliances and partners can work to extend democratic principles, acknowledge humanitarian concerns, prevent violent conflict, identify and stymie political and economic exploitation, and support free and fair media outlets.[41] Thus, developing methods that directly compete in the gray-zone can exist outside the development of like-capabilities. Likewise, NATO cannot immediately establish a multi-agency organization, built to compete across a spectrum of gray-zone activities, empowered to lead, synchronize, and coordinate diverse capabilities across the conflict continuum.[42] Authorities still must be reconfigured down and across to appropriate levels to enable proportionality, when directed.
The good news for US DoD is that it may not have to embark on a complicated restructuring in order to counter Russia’s malign actions. DoD’s current approach places war-fighting authorities under CCMDs. There are certainly numerous challenges in synchronizing priorities, resources, and actions to leverage a broad toolset and eliminate the stovepipes. Indeed, specific capabilities such as information warfare, or offensive cyber, are neither geographically nor functionally limited.[43] Yet while true, just because some gray-zone actions cross geographical and functional lines, this does not inherently mean the response is hindered. While broad oversight may be an enabler, lack of it is not an inhibitor and it does not mean that a Combatant Command is disabled.
In fact, Russia’s activities are often geographically focused — making them ripe for inclusion into CCMD Campaign Plans. Under the current structure, the geographic Combatant Commands are arguably best postured to compete against Russia’s gray-zone activities, taking full advantage of supporting the coordinated activities of USCYBERCOM as well as the expertise of US SOCOM. Specific authorities could be granted now for implementation by US forces in support of NATO objectives to reduce Russia’s information position, as well as granting authorities for the leveraging of the information environment to the benefit of both US and NATO strategic interests.
While a US whole-of-government approach with a singular lead organization is a lofty ideal, this is simply not practical in the short term. There are actions that can be taken to establish a unified purpose, and to ensure that reform priorities for competing in the gray-zone are formed around making the most of available US strengths by mitigating current gaps in the ability to execute national interest-based strategy via campaign plans. If NATO is to deal effectively with such competition, then it too must refocus its own military strategy and forces to give gray-zone and hybrid conflicts at least equal standing with traditional deterrence. At present, NATO has only recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations since 2016. While an important first step in combating gray-zone activities in the information domain, the information centers standing up are limited to situational awareness, along with some planning and coordination tools.[44]The Alliance has yet to refocus its security strategy to address the impact of gray-zone activity across global, regional, and national levels.
Delegated authorities and packaged measures will need to be tailored and based on a better understanding of the strategic intent behind the use of gray-zone tools. This can help the military better engage in the debate and develop capabilities to support Allies in countering non-military threats, such as using special operations, information, and psychological operations. A focused approach with delegated authority would vastly improve NATO’s efficiency in influencing the cost-benefit analysis of potential aggressors in what has now become the modern theatre of operations. In short, if opponents increasingly act in the gray area, NATO must be efficiently enabled to defend, attribute, and respond. The initial structure is in place, but the operationalization of strategy and authority for appropriate comprehensive tools lags.
Defeating Russia’s sophisticated strategy requires strategic competence and a concerted effort to restore confidence in democratic principles, institutions, and processes, along with remediating the vulnerabilities Russia exploits. To compete properly, NATO must articulate clear guidance for its threshold warfare deterrence posture, with options that realistically allow forces to respond to Russian gray-zone behavior. Management of these threats must be an ongoing endeavor, requiring a change in mindset from the deliberate sequential planning processes associated with classic forms of conflict to a more dynamic approach of continuously updated situational awareness, driving political discussion, option development, decision-making, and measured response under political control.
To do this effectively, NATO will have to progress from crisis-response operations to reinvigorate both its military strategy and forces and ensure gray-zone and hybrid conflicts are prioritized along with higher levels of warfare. This may include refocusing its current security strategy to address the overall impact of Russian civil competition at all levels by fully integrating its military, political, and economic strategies and operations. How much of (and when) technological capacity should be delegated down must ultimately be considered and reviewed, along with how NATO integrates response capabilities into the multi-national environment. These gaps must be bridged to enable multinational teaming. Without them, NATO’s plans for deterrence, defense, and dialogue run the risk of becoming reactive, or even outmaneuvered.
Many gray-zone operations will not require the actual use of military force. Some will be entirely civil or economic – using non-military means to achieve strategic or tactical objectives. This will inevitably require ‘whole-of-government’ capacity within NATO structures in a way that NATO is presently not organized or enabled to perform. If NATO members agree that the trend of cyberspace is the most active battlefield, then it is crucial the Alliance has a threat preparation and mitigation plan that is continuously monitored, assessed, and adjusted, with deterrence mechanisms built-in. Presently they are not. The significance to NATO is clear. NATO must overhaul its deterrence strategy, to include options far more nuanced than tactical overmatch, by re-evaluating the role of its military as a deterrent, through increased sub-Article 5 capacities. This might even include support from the private sector and international organizations, with emphasis on a comprehensive approach.
Conclusion
Since its inception, NATO has been more than just a military alliance. It has embraced a political role, unifying Allies behind a common strategic vision. Future uncertainties demand NATO must continue to adapt. Given the significant changes in the security environment since Russia’s incursion into Georgia and Crimea, this presents an opportunity to determine the character of the Alliance’s military capabilities vis-à-vis gray-zone warfare. Future decades will certainly be different than the world the Alliance inhabited during the Cold War. NATO’s cohesion resides in the ability and will to act collectively against shared threats. This is the lifeblood that ensures the vitality, credibility, and durability of NATO. It becomes increasingly important in a sharpened competitive environment requiring collaboration and effective networks. Therefore, the distinctive capabilities required to counter gray-zone warfare must be seriously contemplated.
David Kilcullen points out that flexible adaptation in the West to counter the developments by adversaries of gray-zone conflict is possible, but it requires thinking far beyond the previous generation’s battlefield focus. Where the West “considers these non-military measures ways of avoiding war, Russia considers them part of war itself.”[45] The Russian execution of its modern warfare strategy is not going away. Russia will continue to obfuscate and interfere with decision-making mechanisms and the political cohesion of organizations such as NATO and the UN.[46] Russia will continue to undermine a will to respond to its actions, which in turn will adversely impact the ability of NATO to compete on the international stage.[47] This requires a pragmatic view of what reforms may be possible and what specific capabilities can be made available, given political and budgetary constraints, while equipping forces with the necessary tools to compete. Diplomatic efforts must also inform military decision-makers so the products coming from both are synchronized.
The capacity of the NATO alliance to respond in a coherent way remains an immediate concern. The deterrent options available to NATO commanders are mismatched, insufficient and remain wholly reliant upon member nations to engage. This requires a wholesale review of Sub-Article 5 authorities. Multiple tools spanning a wide range of capabilities must be afforded NATO operational commanders who are being asked to confront new twenty-first-century challenges. In many cases, the center of such competition is indirect and driven as much by information warfare as by any form of physical action. Specific areas of competition are shaped by opportunism and a cycle that will never conform with hard deterrence. If gaining the strategic high ground will occur in the gray area, then to what purpose is the military strength of thirty nations if forces are not structured to operate in a unified coherent fashion, cannot perform deterrence functions, and lack the basic tools of countering twenty-first century adversaries?
About the Authors
Dave Hansen is a career US Army intelligence officer currently serving at the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Morgan Musser works in US Air Force Special Operations Command as an MC-130J pilot serving on Joint Special Operations Air Component - Europe staff, assigned to Mildenhall, United Kingdom. Bruce Villasenor is a Foreign Area Senior Noncommissioned Officer serving as a regional planner at Marine Forces Europe - Africa in Stuttgart, Germany.
The views and opinions in this article do not represent any entity of the US government or department of defense.
References
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[4] Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” Military Review, January-February 2016, available from http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf [5] Vladimir Putin, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, No. Pr.-2976, approved December 25, 2014, Moscow, Russia: The Russian Federation, available from https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. [6] ibid [7] Andrew Monaghan. Russian Grand Strategy: avoiding the barracuda effect. NATO Defense College (2020) https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26056.6 accessed 21 Jan 2021. [8] See, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Ottis2008_AnalysisOf2007FromTheInformationWarfarePerspective.pdf [9] See https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/ [10] General Joseph L. Votel, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee: Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 2015, available at: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20150318/103157/HMTG-114-AS26-Wstate-VotelUSAJ-20150318.pdf. [11] Dr Arnold C. Dupuy, Dr Dan Nussbaum, Vytautas Butrimas, Alkman Granitsas Energy security in the era of hybrid warfar. 13 Jan 2021. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/01/13/energy-security-in-the-era-of-hybrid-warfare/index.html [12] Anika Binnendijk. Understanding Russian Black Sea Power Dynamics Through National Security Gaming. The Rand Coroporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3000/RR3094/RAND_RR3094.pdf [13] At the June 2016 Defense Ministerial Meeting, the NATO Defense Ministers agreed to recognize cyberspace as an operational domain; the decision was endorsed and reaffirmed at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 [14] Adams, Geoffrey. "Common Purpose in an Increasingly Unpredictable World: The Wales NATO Summit." Atlantisch Perspectief 38, no. 6 (2014): 25-26. Accessed February 15, 2021. doi:10.2307/48581156. [15] For full text, see The NATO Readiness Action Plan. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm [16] 2016 Warsaw Summit Declaration, para.72. [17] Rühle, Michael, and Clare Roberts. The Alliance Five Years after Crimea: Implementing the Wales Summit Pledges. Report. Edited by Ozawa Marc. NATO Defense College, 2019. 61-70. Accessed February 15, 2021. doi:10.2307/resrep23664.11. [18] See also “NATO’s response to hybrid threats”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm [19] Official NATO documents specifically highlight that individual nations retain primacy in responding to hybrid actions. Meaning, response to threshold actions are initially the domain of individual nations, and not necessarily a collective response problem. [20] “National Counterterrorism Center,” Congressional Research Service, July 11, 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/IF10709.pdf. [21] This included the introduction of “Counter-Hybrid Support Teams” (CHST) -civilian teams that could be deployed on short notice to an ally requesting NATO’s support. NATO also created Military Advisory Teams, which followed a similar logic to their civilian counterparts. [22] Hill, Jonathan, “NATO- Ready for Anything?,” NATO Review, January 24, 2019, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/01/24/nato-ready-for-anything/index.html.. [23] Ibid. [24] John-Michael Arnold. NATO’s Readiness Action Plan: Strategic Benefits and Outstanding Challenges. Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 10, No. 1 (SPRING 2016), pp. 74-105. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26271088 [25] Deni, John. NATO’S PRESENCE IN THE EAST: NECESSARY BUT STILL NOT SUFFICIENT. 27 June 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/natos-presence-in-the-east-necessary-but-still-not-sufficient/. Accessed 22 Feb 2021 [26] Ibid. [27] Coffy, Luke. “Russian dominance in the Black Sea: The Sea of Azov” 25 Sep, 2020. https://www.mei.edu/publications/russian-dominance-black-sea-sea-azov [28] Hill, Jonathan, ibid. [29] NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11-12 July 2018 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm [30] The official website details operations, missions, and studies. https://ccdcoe.org [31] Susan Davis, General Rapporteur, NATO Science And Technology Committee. NATO IN THE CYBER AGE: STRENGTHENING SECURITY & DEFENCE, STABILISING DETERRENCE 18 April 2019 [32] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm [33] Brussels Summit Declaration. Press Release (2018) 074 Issued on 11 Jul. 2018 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm [34] Katie Lange, “Cybercom: How DOD’s Newest Unified ‘Cocom’ Works,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 12, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/1660928/cybercom-how-dods-newest-unified-cocom-works/. [35] Hicks, Kathleen et al. “By Other Means, Adapting to Compete in the gray-zone.” page 29 https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-ii-adapting-compete-gray-zone accessed: 08 Feb 2021 [36] See https://www.hybridcoe.fi/establishment/ [37] See also, U.S. National Security Council, “National Security Decision Directive 2,” January 12, 1982, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-2.pdf [38] Michael C. McCarthy, Matthew A. Moyer and Brett H. Venable. DETERRING RUSSIA IN THE GRAY-ZONE. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (2019). http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep20099.12 [39] Hicks, Kathleen et al. “By Other Means, Adapting to Compete in the gray-zone.” page 29 https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-ii-adapting-compete-gray-zone accessed: 08 Feb 2021 [40] ibid p. 29 [41] ibid p 13 [42] The US has the capability to be a formidable and effective gray-zone actor but does not yet have a plan to employ or integrate its capabilities to achieve its objectives,” Schaus writes in a CSIS report, “Competing in the gray-zone. [43] Eastin, Anthony. Franck, Patrick.“Restructuring Information Warfare in the United States: Shaping the Narrative of the Future” AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL – FEATURE. Winter 2020 [44] Brent, Laura “NATO’s role in cyberspace” Feb 2019 NATO Review. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/02/12/natos-role-in-cyberspace/index.html accessed 12 Feb 2021. [45] Book Review, Dragons and Snakes. Financial Times London. 13 March 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/5422385e-6218-11ea-abcc-910c5b38d9ed [46] (Wither 2016). [47] Giles, K. (2015), ‘Russia’s Hybrid Warfare: A Success in Propaganda’, Security Policy Working Paper, No.1/2015, Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_security_policy_1_20 15.pdf, Accessed online
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