(Photo: Kyiv, Ukraine - Subway station serves as a shelter for civilians during an attack)
By CPT Brendan Fries, 1LT Jesse Guttman, and CPT Daniel Torkelson
The Russo-Ukrainian war has highlighted the ever-growing complexities that military commanders face when dealing with urban warfare in the age of information technology. Technologically fueled innovation, compounded with a growing global population density, has led to the creation of a complex urban environment where the vast majority of utility and transportation infrastructure no longer exists above ground. As cities continue to grow and urbanize, utilities that have long existed on the surface such as power, telecommunication, fiber optic, and gas, have increasingly transitioned to subterranean pathways. Civil society has become reliant more than ever on the underground domain for stability. But the conflict has not only brought attention to the added complexity; it also revealed a need for emerging subterranean doctrine to address the underground domain’s civil considerations for both combat and stability operations.
The subterranean operating environment is a new focus for the United States Army despite having spent years fighting in it. In 2018, the Defense Intelligence Agency director Lt. General Robert Ashley proposed classifying “underground” as a new warfare domain.[i] The Department of Defense (DoD) has put significant effort into defining organizational roles and developing subterranean tactics. These efforts culminated in 2019 with the publication of the Subterranean Operations ATP 3-21.51, as well as doctrinal updates across the DoD to account for the inclusion of the underground domain.[ii] The civilian component of METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians) has been underdeveloped compared to the kinetic and force protection focused capabilities in the Army’s subterranean warfare approach. People who are unable to flee the battlespace–either because they cannot afford it or because of a degraded transportation network–will shelter in the subterranean until military forces encounter them. Yet current doctrine nearly ignores this scenario which is particularly likely in economically depressed areas of megacities.[iii] subterranean and surface operations during near-peer conflicts would not only force civilians to seek shelter underground but potentially place them directly between or beneath U.S. and opposition forces. This has undeniable implications for the plans process and operational environment. The implications are broader than the kinetic effects of large-scale subterranean military operations, as any action that affects troops on the surface is likely to filter down and affect citizens seeking shelter in the subterranean. Similarly, subterranean infrastructure is the driving force behind supporting, power, water, sanitation, and other critical components of the surface society. Any damage to subterranean infrastructure or “substructure” negatively impacts every aspect of civilian life. Surface and underground urban development are now permanently intertwined.[iv] Civil Affairs, as the branch proponent for Civil Affairs Operations (CAO), Civil-Military Operations (CMO), and Civil Knowledge Integration (CKI), must take the lead in developing, testing, and codifying the civilian considerations of the subterranean operating environment for the Army and DoD.
Over thirty years have passed since the U.S. Army was last oriented towards near-peer or peer threats. Since the 1990s, the average population density has grown by 30% globally.[v] With this increase in density, comes an increased demand for utilities and transportation solutions to address above-ground congestion. Subterranean transportation networks such as subway systems remain the most desirable solution for city planners to address congestion.[vi] These systems provide significant economic revenue and thus stability for financially depressed areas. In Mexico City, the subway system transports 5.5 million passengers a day with an average fare of 0.25 USD.[vii] This generates profits of 1.375 million USD in daily fares for Mexico City alone. With the increasing dependence on underground utility and transportation networks, it is clear that successful stability operations in urban environments will need to consider the civil subterranean considerations to address civil vulnerabilities. Combat operations, on the other hand, come with their own civil vulnerabilities that can be solved by subterranean considerations. They provide naturally hardened structures that protect civilians and utilities from the devastation of urban warfare. In Kyiv, Ukraine, daily indirect fire from Russian forces continues to threaten the civil domain by disrupting access to power, food, water, sanitation, and protection infrastructure. Below the war-torn streets the water, power, and sewer lines flow uninterrupted; fifteen thousand citizens live in metro stations where trains are still able to ferry passengers to safety.[viii]
Civil-Military Operations are well-suited for the complexity of the subterranean problem set. Urban warfare is accompanied by large-scale humanitarian crises, and proper Civil Affairs Staff analysis of the subterranean can mitigate human suffering and convert the subterranean into a force multiplier for civil population and resource management. Ground and superstructures have traditionally been reconnoitered and repurposed for CAO in complex urban environments;[ix] Civil Reconnaissance doctrine, training, and TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) focus solely on surface structures.[x] Subsurface structures have been ignored despite their common use as shelters by the civilian populace. As humanity becomes increasingly more urbanized, and warfare continues to shift toward high-intensity and hybrid conflicts, the use of substructure by civilians on the battlefield will continue to increase. Subterranean considerations will be an important part of CMO planning to reduce collateral damage and minimize disruption of the civil populace and resources in near-peer conflict. While subterranean warfare is a new doctrinal concept for western militaries, the use of subterranean for civil considerations has been well documented throughout history.
The use of the London Underground during “The Blitz'' of 1940-41 to house civilians at night during air raids is a classic example of underground structure employment by military governance during wartime. Similarly, in 1961 the U.S. Government worked to encourage citizens to construct homemade bomb shelters to reduce civil vulnerability to emerging kinetic threats.[xi] Comprehensive literature was distributed to inform citizens on how to seek shelter in the event of a kinetic strike, some of it even suggested using subway stations or hardened underground infrastructure. This type of subterranean use persists today with one of the more recognizable examples being the South Korean Subway System. In the event of a near-peer escalation, the South Korean military still plans to utilize the Seoul Metro System to shelter civilians.[xii] This use is a prime example of how subterranean considerations can be implemented in the CMO Planning Process prior to and after combat operations. Early CMO inputs to the plans process will allow identification of likely subterranean access points and infrastructure capable of sheltering civilians. By identifying key infrastructure prior to operations, we can minimize the impact and disruption to civil society through active protection. After operations, we can continue to leverage our knowledge of the subterranean to ensure timely response, coordination, and employment of humanitarian resources to protect civil resource supply and society. This aligns with the Civil Affairs mission by reducing civil vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries, and actively seeking to minimize civilian casualties and the impact to operations through efforts to reduce human suffering.
The use of the subsurface environment by civilians is not exclusive to conflict in modern cities or industrialized nations. The trend of civilians fleeing to underground structures dates back to antiquity. In 700 BCE., the Turks began construction of the underground city of Derinkuyu to protect and hide civilian populations from invasion or persecution. This thinking continued to serve them as modern-day Turkey employed subterranean infrastructure until the 20th century. There is equal evidence to suggest that even in industrialized nations, civilians would still be forced to use subterranean infrastructure as ad-hoc shelters. During the 20th century, governments such as Switzerland and South Korea constructed dedicated bunkers to shelter civilians. These were never large or plentiful enough to house the majority of their populations and have mostly been ignored or forgotten by governments with post-Cold War de-escalation, but not all subterranean shelters were lost to time. Syrians fleeing aerial bombardment by the Assad Regime used ancient Roman caves as temporary shelters.[xiii] The historical record confirms that civilians naturally flock to safety in subterranean structures during war. We should expect to see this pattern continue across geographic and cultural lines, and at all population densities.
An intuitive understanding of existing underground facilities and knowledge of the utility of subsurface spaces is crucial for successful unified land operations. Civil Affairs Soldiers can leverage the Civil Domain to build a comprehensive understanding of subterranean structures. Through Civil Network Development and Engagement (CNDE), Civil Affairs units can identify critical infrastructure and subject matter experts, conduct Civil Reconnaissance and Civil Engagements, and facilitate knowledge exchanges. We can leverage these Civil Affairs competencies to map out subterranean environments for combatant commands prior to operations. This enables planning staff to support not only CAO or CMO but other critical tasks such as support to Special Reconnaissance. This is a small example of how CKI is critical for “extending the battlefield.” The Russo-Ukrainian war has seen an increase in targeting against above-ground marked civilian sites. Uniquely, the conflict has also seen a mass exodus of citizens with a simultaneous influx of civilian aid workers, and logistical support. CNDE efforts that identify viable subterranean infrastructure enable Civil Affairs practitioners to move vulnerable supplies, refugees, or civilians to the safety of subsurface structures when other viable means have been denied or degraded.
A current example of this mentioned earlier in the paper is the use of Kyiv’s Metro subway stations. These stations are among the deepest in the world and have been repurposed as alternative spaces for refugee camps, hospitals, and even sites to host visiting foreign dignitaries.[xiv] While Kyiv faces a constant threat of bombardment with numerous structures unfit for occupancy above ground, the deep caverns of the metro have proven relatively safe. Like the ancient Turks, the Ukrainians have found a way to continue a semblance of urbanized life underground in the midst of urban conflict.[xv] A similar use has been found for substructures in other Ukrainian cities. In Mariupol, hospitals have moved to underground tunnels beneath steel plants.[xvi] These hardened subterranean structures have allowed physicians and medics to care for the increasing numbers of patients, albeit with dwindling supplies. This is eerily reminiscent of the “cellar war” seen in the last days of the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943. During the battle, the remains of the German 6th Army went underground in an attempt to survive the Russian winter and Soviet counter-offensive.[xvii] These historical parallels are repetitive throughout the history of subterranean warfare. They are the keys to understanding future conflicts and managing civil considerations for military planning focused on the Underground Domain.
To address current gaps, and for the U.S. Army to be ready for the next subterranean-adjacent conflict, two things must happen simultaneously: doctrinal updates in the next three years and the addition of a new mission-essential task (MET) at the tactical level. First, in conjunction with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), subterranean doctrine should be reviewed five years from the date of the last update (in this case, November 2024). U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) must jointly provide input in light of the recent deactivation of the Asymmetric Warfare Group. The review should take no more than one year and result in republishing. This will ensure the lessons learned in Ukraine are already available for the next neer-peer conflict before any civilians begin migrating underground. Second, A MET should be added for Civil Affairs battalions to “conduct subterranean operations,” forcing an implied task to develop SOPs at home station and to train on these contingencies alongside supported units during training center rotations. To fulfill this MET during peacetime or stability operations, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) would appoint a subterranean liaison officer who would coordinate with subject matter experts found across the spectrum of unified action partners. Acting at these two levels at the same time avoids the trap of downtrace units waiting for years on the long doctrinal publishing process and instead forces them to begin studying the subterranean environments in their own area of responsibility. Commanders and CMOCs will need to begin interacting with partners and develop their own unit SOPs tailored to their mission and resources, giving them the advantage in future conflicts which seem capable of developing overnight.
Underground civil spaces are, and will continue to be, critical to civilian protection and utilization in conflict areas around the world. Civil Affairs practitioners should familiarize themselves with the myriad of uses and possibilities which subsurface structures present for the application of civil-military operations. The core competencies of CKI, Transitional Governance, and CMI (Civil Military Integration) all directly or indirectly feature subterranean considerations for dense urban areas. Knowledge of existing subterranean spaces and their potential uses provides immeasurable benefits to local populations and governments in a time of war. Underground spaces when accurately assessed through Civil Reconnaissance can provide support and control to the civilians of a city undergoing combat or potential bombing/indirect fires. CNDE focused on the subterranean allows us to identify which subterranean spaces are capable of providing shelter and clean air despite power outages and bombardment. These spaces can be repurposed as crucial shelters for populations trapped and unable to flee due to the confines of urban conflict. The location of a CMOC in a secure space enables the potential for civil-military information sharing on subsurface edifices before, during, and after a conflict occurs. There is an undeniable paramount need for subterranean knowledge when conducting civil affairs in urban environments. Substructure is woven like a supporting network for above ground development. It remains interconnected with every aspect of civil life either directly or indirectly. Power, water, sanitation, transportation, and communication infrastructure are all reliant on subterranean pathways. The Civil Affairs mission in the post-GWOT urban environment cannot be successful without an understanding and baseline familiarity with subterranean geography. Most Civil Affairs practitioners lack basic awareness or understanding of the implications of the subterranean for the Civil Domain. This understanding has the potential to be a force-multiplier and a critical asset to any Civil Affairs soldiers at the operational or strategic level.
Subterranean conflict remains an unavoidable component of warfare, and like Civil Affairs Operations, it is often neglected in military planning and preparation of the battlespace. Further emphasis on understanding the civil considerations of subterranean conflict is critical to the future of warfare in an increasingly urbanized world. The current conflict in Ukraine highlights why planning to address and provide for civilians and resources in the underground domain is vital. These plans protect civilians and enable civil resistance against adversarial affiliation attempts. Codification of lessons learned, and a small amount of training will yield immense benefits in the next war for both the Civil Affairs practitioner and the Department of Defense.
About the Authors
CPT Brendan Fries is an Army Reserve Civil Affairs Team Chief in the 450th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) out of White Plains, MD. He received his Master of Science from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. He also received a Bachelor of Science from Arizona State University. He works as a civilian epidemiologist and academic researcher in Washington D.C.
1LT Jesse Guttman is an Army Reserve Civil Affairs Team Chief in the 450th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) out of White Plains, MD. He is currently pursuing a Master of Science in Analysis at Johns Hopkins University and received his Bachelor of Arts in History from McDaniel College. He works as a civilian analyst in Washington, D.C.
CPT Daniel Torkelson is an Army Reserve Civil Affairs Team Chief in the 450th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) out of White Plains, MD. He received his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Azusa Pacific University. He works as a data scientist in Washington, D.C.
Standard Disclaimer. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied above are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of any organization or any entity of the U.S. government.
Endnotes:
[i] Defense One. “‘Underground’ May Be the U.S. Military’s Next Warfighting Domain.” Accessed June 2, 2022. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/06/underground-may-be-us-militarys-next-warfighting-domain/149296/. [ii] Headquarters, Department of the Army. Subterranean Operations. Vol. ATP 3-21.51, 2019. https://armypubs.army.mil https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard. [iii] Micciche, James. “Civil Information Management in Urban Environments.” Civil Affairs Association, March 7, 2020. https://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/post/civil-information-management-in-urban-environments. [iv] Ontiveros, James J. “Megacities and Dense Urban Areas: Challenges in the Future Operating Environment.” Special Warfare Magazine 31, no. 4 (December 2018). https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW3104/31-4_OCT_DEC_2018_ web.pdf. [v] Staff, “Population Density (People per Sq. Km of Land Area),” World Bank (World Bank, 2022), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST. [vi]Mao, Ruichang, Yi Bao, Huabo Duan, and Gang Liu. “Global Urban Subway Development, Construction Material Stocks, and Embodied Carbon Emissions.” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 8, no. 1 (December 2021): 83. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00757-2. [vii] Shirai Reyna, Olivia Sashiko, Idalia Flores de la Mota, and Katya Rodríguez Vázquez. “Complex Networks Analysis: Mexico’s City Metro System during the Pandemic of COVID-19.” Case Studies on Transport Policy 9, no. 4 (December 2021): 1459–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cstp.2021.07.003. [viii]O'Sullivan, F. (2022, March 14). As Thousands Shelter in Stations, Kyiv’s Metro Is Still Running Trains. Bloomberg: CityLab. Retrieved May 27, 2022, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-14/how-kyiv-transformed-its-subway-into-a-bomb-shelter. [ix]“FM 3-57 CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS,” 2021. https://armypubs.army.mil. [x]HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. “Civil Affairs General Concepts,” 2019. [xi]Hassebroek, Naomi Kroll. “COLD WAR CIVIL DEFENSE: FROM ‘DUCK AND COVER’ TO ‘GUN THY NEIGHBOR.’” National Park Service: Kennedy, Rockefeller, and Civil Defense. September 2018. https://www.nps.gov/articles/coldwar_civil defense_ kennedyrockefellerandcd.html. [xii]The Columbian. “North Korean Submarine Missile Launch Shows Improved Ability.” Accessed June 2, 2022. https://www.columbian.com/news/2016/aug/24/north-korean-submarine-missile-launch-shows-improved-ability/. [xiii]Chivers, C. J. “Jammed in Roman Caves, Ducking Syria’s War.” The New York Times, March 24, 2013, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/world/ middleeast/syrians-fleeing-home-crowd-in-roman-caves.html. [xiv]Bloomberg.com. “As Thousands Shelter in Stations, Kyiv’s Metro Is Still Running Trains,” March 14, 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-14/how-kyiv-transformed-its-subway-into-a-bomb-shelter. [xv]“U2: Bono, The Edge Play Ukraine ‘Freedom’ Concert in Kyiv Metro | Russia-Ukraine War News | Al Jazeera.” Accessed June 2, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/9/u2s-bono-performs-ukraine-freedom-concert-in-kyiv-metro. [xvi]ITV News. “Ukrainian Medics at Underground Hospital Do Surgery in ‘medieval’ Conditions,” April 27, 2022. https://www.itv.com/news/2022-04-27/ukrainian-medics-at-underground-hospital-do-surgery-in-medieval-conditions. [xvii]Schröter, Heinz. Stalingrad. M. Joseph, 1958.